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1 INTRODUCTION 
In Pride and Prejudice, Jane Austen’s character Elizabeth Darcy offers the following ad-
vice:1 
You must learn some of my philosophy. Think only of the past as its remembrance 
gives you pleasure. 
In the digital age, Elizabeth Darcy’s philosophy has become increasingly hard to abide by; 
with vast amounts of personal information online, readily accessible by a simple search 
engine enquiry of a person’s name, for many it is impossible to escape the omnipresent 
intrusion of the internet into their private lives. 
As a means to temper this digital threat, the EU has recently recognised a qualified legal 
right whereby a person can require a SEO to remove (delink) certain search results that 
would otherwise be displayed in response to a particular search enquiry (hereafter referred 
to as a “right to delinking”). This paper critically examines the operation of this right as it 
applies to truthful, legally published personal information on websites that are publically 
available and accessible through search engine results. 
Several demarcations have been made to the discussion. Although it is acknowledged that a 
right to erasure might arise with respect to other functions provided by SEOs (such as ‘au-
tocomplete’), the present discussion is limited to the right to delinking.2 Furthermore, as the 
focus is on delinking of legally published information, it is assumed that dissemination of 
that information cannot be restrained by the application of other legal doctrines such as 
contract, defamation, copyright, confidentiality or criminal law. Finally, the discussion 
concerns information that is publically available online. Therefore, the paper does not con-
                                                 
 
1 Austen, Jane, Pride and Prejudice (1853, RD Bentley), p323. 
2 Regarding autocomplete, see: Stuart, Allyson, ‘Google Search Results: Buried if not Forgotten’ (Spring 
2014) 15(3) North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 463, p480-481; Alsenoy, Van, Aleksandra 
Kuczerawy and Jef Ausloos, Search Engines after 'Google Spain': Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril? 
(ICRI Research Paper 15, University of Leuven, 6 September 2013), p39-40. 
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sider the right to erasure with respect to personal information surreptitiously gathered by 
websites or search engines.3 
The paper is structured in three parts. Part A provides a general introduction to the concepts 
that underpin the substantive analysis. Part B contains an outline of the right to delinking in 
the EU. The section sets out the current position under the DPD4 following the seminal 
decision in Google Spain,5 and interprets the likely future position under the GDPR.6 Part 
C provides the central discussion of the paper; a critical analysis of the right to delinking. 
This analysis is split into four areas; whether the framework appropriately balances the 
conflicting fundamental rights that are involved; the problems that arise from treating a 
SEO as a controller; the extra-territorial implications of the right; and the potential econom-
ic concerns. The paper submits that, on balance, there are significant concerns with the op-
eration of the right to delinking. 
2 PART A – AN INTRODUCTION TO DELINKING 
2.1 Privacy and other fundamental rights in the EU 
In the EU the right to privacy and data protection are considered fundamental rights. Arti-
cle 6(1) of the TFEU recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter.7 
Article 8(1) of the Charter states that “everyone has the right to the protection of personal 
data”, a right which is closely connected to the right to respect of “private and family life, 
home and communications” expressed in Article 7.8 Owing to this interrelationship, hereaf-
                                                 
 
3 For example, through the use of ‘cookies’ or the retention of a person’s search requests. 
4 European Commission, Directive 95/46/EC (23 November 1995) No. L281 Official Journal of the European 
Union 31-50. 
5 Google Spain SL & Anor v AEPD & Anor, ECJ Case no. C-131/12, delivered 13 May 2014. 
6 The version of the GDPR as passed by the European Parliament on 12 March 2014: European Parliament 
legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the General Data Protection Regulation (12 March 2014) (“EU 
Parliament Resolution”) 
7 See Kuner, Christopher, The Court of Justice of the EU Judgment on Data Protection and Internet Search 
Engines: Current Issues and Future Challenges (15 September 2014), p2. 
8 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen, ECJ Case No. C-92/09, delivered 9 
November 2010 (“C-92/09”), [47]. 
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ter the fundamental rights to data protection and privacy will simply by referred to as the 
right to privacy. 
The right to privacy is not however an absolute right, and it is well established that it may 
be restrained by recognition of other fundamental rights. In this respect, two other funda-
mental rights are of particular relevance for present purposes. Article 11 of the Charter pro-
vides that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the right to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority.9 Article 16 rec-
ognises the freedom to conduct business. The difficulty of reconciling these fundamental 
rights with one another in the case of a request for delinking is explored in Part C. 
2.2 The idea of a right to erasure 
In view of the ever increasing digital threat to privacy, there is a perceived need for greater 
online privacy protections for individuals. The right to erasure is one such form of protec-
tion. Conceptually, the idea is relatively simple; where appropriate, grant people the legal 
right to demand that an entity processing their data erase their personal information.  
Notwithstanding the common reference to a right to be forgotten, as will be evident from 
the below discussion it is more appropriate to speak of the right as a right to erasure. This is 
because the right in its present form does not envisage broad notions of ‘forgetting’, but is 
simply concerned with a person’s right to demand erasure of their personal data held by 
others.10 
                                                 
 
9 See also, ECHR Article 10. 
10 Cuijpers, Colette, Nadezhda Purtova and Eleni Kosta, Data Protection Reform and the Internet: The Draft 
Data Protection Regulation (Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No.03/2014, Tilburg 
University, 2014), p10. McNealy, Jasmine, ‘The Emerging Conflict Between Newsworthiness and the Right 
to be Forgotten’ (2012) 39(2) Northern Kentucky Law Review 119, p121-122. 
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2.3 The right to delinking 
2.3.1 How a search engine works 
To begin with, it is appropriate to briefly introduce the manner in which a search engine 
actually operates. Given its dominant market role,11 for present purposes it is adequate to 
focus on Google Search.  
Google Inc, a US company, operates Google Search worldwide through the website 
google.com. Google Search begins by ‘crawling’ or searching webpages using software 
robots. Having discovered publicly available information, Google’s software organises that 
information into an index.12 That index is currently “well over 100,000,000 gigabytes” and 
has taken over one million computing hours to build.13  
When a user inputs a search query, Google’s algorithms look up the search terms in the 
index and display appropriate results. The exact manner in which the results are generated 
is not entirely known; the relevant algorithms are not publicly available, and accordingly 
some liken Google Search to a black box.14 However, Google does provide limited insight 
into the operation of its algorithms.15 Google’s algorithms rely on more than 200 unique 
signals or ‘clues’ that make it possible to guess what a user might be looking for. These 
signals include things like the terms on websites, the freshness of content, the user’s region 
and PageRank.16 While the algorithms operate automatically, they are obviously subject to 
human oversight and are continually updated. Also, on occasion Google manually edits its 
                                                 
 
11 In 2013, it is estimated that Google held about 90 per cent of the global market share for internet search 
requests. The nearest competitors are Bing and Yahoo! with less than four per cent each; see Stuart, above n2, 
p472. 
12 See: Stuart, above n2, p473-474; Google Spain, [43]. 
13 Google, Inside Search – How Search Works. 
14 Stuart, above n2, p472-473. 
15 Google, above n13. 
16 PageRank makes use of the link structure of the web to calculate a quality ranking for each webpage. It 
works by counting the number and quality of links to a webpage page, based on the assumption that more 
important websites are likely to receive more links: Brin, Sergey and Lawrence Page, ‘The anatomy of a 
large-scale hypertextual Web search engine’ (1998) 30 Computer Networks and ISDN Systems 107, p109-
110. See also, Stuart, above n2, p474-475. 
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results; for example in the case of copyright, child sexual imagery or in order to remove 
spam.17 
Google Search also incorporates a number of other features.18 For the purpose of this paper, 
it is sufficient to note that Google provides more relevant content based on geographic re-
gion. This includes providing, in some states, a locally adapted version such as google.no. 
2.3.2 The different contexts in which delinking can be pursued 
This paper will consider three different scenarios where a person might pursue delinking of 
search results. The first scenario is where a search request comprising the subject’s name 
generates links to websites which are considered undesirable by the subject (hereafter 
called a “name-search”). The second scenario is where the search results to a particular 
search query (not specifically about the subject) include links to the subject in a manner 
that the subject considers undesirable (hereafter called a “non-name-search”). The third 
scenario sits between the first two; a search of the subject’s name accompanied by a partic-
ular search query. For example, “Kim Kardashian Twitter Posts” (hereafter called a “com-
posite-name-search”).  
It is important to note that in some cases where a subject has a right to delinking, that sub-
ject will also have a right to erasure against the actual website that is listed in the search 
results. In view of the preceding subsection, it follows that if that webpage itself is deleted 
then Google Search will no longer provide a link to that webpage in its search results.19 
Accordingly, a right to erasure against a website can also indirectly lead to delinking from 
search results. The question which naturally follows is; why pursue the SEO and not the 
actual website? 
                                                 
 
17 Stuart, above n2, p475-476. 
18 Google, above n13. 
19 Alsenoy, above n2, p14. 
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2.3.3 Why pursue delinking from search engine results? 
Broadly speaking, there are three main reasons why the right to delinking is attractive. The 
first reason stems from the indispensable role that search engines play in the operation of 
the internet. Search engines are the primary determinant of how most average internet users 
find information.20 As one commentator noted:21  
For finding information that is not otherwise presented to the user as an address or 
active link… Google is the Internet. Search engines are crucial, enabling Internet 
users’ perusal of an otherwise-unmanageable number of websites. 
Unsurprisingly, search engines are used extensively. For example, one study found that 73 
per cent of all Americans use search engines.22 It follows that, for an internet user wishing 
to enforce their right to erasure, in many ways the SEO is the best place to start; delinking 
makes the information appreciably more difficult to find and thereby gives the subject a 
level of ‘practical obscurity’.23 
The second reason delinking is attractive is because it is likely to be significantly easier 
than pursuing erasure against the actual websites. Given the ease at which online infor-
mation can be replicated on other sites, a person may need to seek erasure from multiple 
different webpages in multiple jurisdictions.24 In these circumstances enforcement against 
the websites is likely to be a time consuming, expensive and difficult process, to the extent 
that it may be an impractical option. By comparison the SEO, which acts as a gateway to 
the various websites, is likely to offer a user friendly means of lodging the delinking re-
quest.25 
                                                 
 
20 Stuart, above n2, p467-468, 471-472. 
21 Stuart, above n2, p471. See also Alsenoy, above n2, p7. 
22 Stuart, above n2, p471-472. 
23 Stuart, above n2, p470. Google Spain, [87]. 
24 Google Spain, [84]. Alsenoy, above n2, p5. 
25 See, for example, the obligation in amended GDPR Article 19(2b). 
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Finally, delinking may achieve practical erasure in circumstances where the right to erasure 
is not legally enforceable against the website. This situation can arise in two ways; where 
the relevant website is hosted in a jurisdiction that does not recognise the right to erasure, 
or where the third party publication is lawful by reason of an exemption to the right.26 In 
these situations, by proceeding against the SEO a person may be able to effectively enforce 
erasure even though they do not have a right against the actual website. 
3 PART B – OVERVIEW OF THE EU RIGHT TO DELINKING 
3.1 The DPD and the decision in Google Spain 
3.1.1 The basis for the dispute in Google Spain 
In 2010 Mr Gonzalez, a Spanish national resident, lodged a complaint with AEPD (the 
Spanish Data Protection Agency) against La Vanguardia (a Spanish Newspaper), Google 
Inc and Google Spain. The complaint arose from the fact that when an internet user did a 
name-search for Mr Gonzalez on google.es, the search engine generated links to two La 
Vanguardia news articles from early 1998. Those two articles contained an announcement 
of a real-estate auction connected with attachment proceedings against Mr Gonzalez for the 
recovery of social security debts.27 
In his complaint, Mr Gonzalez requested that La Vanguardia remove or alter the webpages. 
He also requested that Google Spain or Google Inc be required to remove or conceal the 
links in the search results. As the attachment proceedings were resolved many years earlier, 
Mr Gonzalez argued the references were irrelevant.28 
                                                 
 
26 Google Spain, [85]-[86]. 
27 Google Spain, [14]. Advocate General Jääskinen, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered 25 
June 2013 – Case C-131/12 – Google Spain SL & Anor v AEPD & Anor (25 June 2013) (“AG Opinion”), 
[18]. 
28 Google Spain, [15]. 
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3.1.2 Procedural history 
The AEPD rejected the claims against La Vanguardia on the basis that its publication was 
legally justified.29 However, the AEPD upheld the complaint against Google Spain and 
Google Inc. 
Google Spain and Google Inc subsequently commenced actions in the Audiencia Nacional 
(National High Court) against the decision by AEPD.30 The Spanish Court referred a num-
ber of questions concerning the DPD to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.31 Essentially, 
those questions can be broadly summarised as concerning the following three issues: the 
‘territorial scope’ of the DPD;32 whether Google Inc, in providing Google Search, was 
‘processing’ data and a ‘controller’;33 the scope of a data subject’s rights under DPD Arti-
cles 12(b) and 14(a), and whether there is a right to require delinking from the results in a 
name-search.34 
3.1.3 Judgment – first issue – the ‘territorial scope’ 
As to the relationship between Google Inc and Google Spain, it was established that 
Google Inc was responsible for Google Search, including google.es, and that it conducted 
those activities outside of the EU. The activities of Google Spain were limited to promoting 
the sale of advertising space and acting as the commercial agent for Google Inc.35 Accord-
ingly, only Google Inc dealt directly with personal data with respect to Google Search. 
                                                 
 
29 Ibid, [16]. 
30 Ibid, [18]. 
31 AG Opinion, above n27, [6]. 
32 Google Spain, [45]. 
33 Ibid, [21]. 
34 It is acknowledged that the ECJ drew a distinction between referred Questions 2(c) and 2(d), and Question 
3; see, respectively, [62]-[88] compared to [89]-[99]. However, on a proper analysis this author considers 
there is no meaningful distinction between the two questions; both essentially concerned the scope of the 
right to erasure and the Court offered analogous reasoning in each case. Accordingly, the two questions will 
be dealt with together.  
35 Google Spain, [43], [46], [51]. 
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DPD Article 4(1)(a) provides that Member States must apply their national laws to pro-
cessing carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller in 
the Member State. Given the relationship between Google Inc and Google Spain, the ECJ 
concluded that the processing of personal data by Google Inc occurred in the context of 
Google Spain’s commercial and advertising activities in Spain (the activities of the two 
entities were inextricably linked).36 Accordingly, the DPD applied to the activities of 
Google Inc in providing its Google Search function in Spain. 
3.1.4 Judgment – second issue – ‘processing’ and ‘controller’ 
This question concerned whether Google Inc, in providing Google Search, was “processing 
personal data” and a “controller” of that data. Under Article 2(1)(b), “processing of person-
al data” is defined as any operations performed upon personal data, whether or not by au-
tomatic means, such as (inter alia) collection, recording, organisation, storage, retrieval or 
making available. The ECJ noted that Google Inc, in providing Google Search, searches the 
internet for published information, ‘collects’ such data and subsequently ‘retrieves’, ‘rec-
ords’ and ‘organises’ it as part of its indexing programmes. Therefore, the ECJ held that in 
view of the wording in Article 2(1)(b) such activity clearly constituted processing.37 
“Controller” is defined in Article 2(1)(d) of the DPD as the natural or legal person which 
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing. Google 
Inc argued it was not a controller since it had no knowledge of the data and did not exercise 
control over it (that control inherently being with the website publisher).38 However, the 
ECJ had little difficulty concluding that a SEO is a controller. Reciting the definition of 
controller, it held that a SEO clearly determines the “purposes and means” of the pro-
cessing. It was noted that this processing can be distinguished from, and is additional to, 
processing carried out by the actual webpage publisher. Therefore, it did not matter that the 
                                                 
 
36 Ibid, [56]. 
37 Ibid, [28]. 
38 Ibid, [22]. 
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search engine does not exercise control over the actual publication of the data on the inter-
net.39 
3.1.5 Judgment – third issue – the scope of the right to delinking 
The third issue essentially concerned whether a subject could require delinking from the 
results of a name-search based on Articles 12(b) and 14(a) of the DPD. Article 12(b) pro-
vides that a data subject has the right to obtain from a controller the “rectification, erasure 
or blocking” of data where that processing does not comply with the Directive. Per Articles 
6(1)(c) to (e), the processing may not comply if it is inadequate, excessive or no longer 
relevant, or excessive in relation to the purpose of the SEO’s processing.40 
The SEO’s processing may also not comply with the Directive if Article 7(f) is not met. 
Under that Article, the processing by a SEO is lawful because it is necessary for the legiti-
mate interests of the SEO.41 However, Article 7(f) requires that the SEO’s legitimate inter-
ests not be overridden by the fundamental rights of the subject. Therefore, the application 
of Article 7(f) necessitates a balancing of opposing rights and interests.42 If the subject’s 
rights do override the legitimate interests of the SEO, there are two potential implications. 
Firstly, the processing does not comply with the Directive and Article 12(b) is enlivened.43 
Secondly, if a subject has objected to the processing on “compelling legitimate grounds” 
under Article 14(a), that objection would be justified and per Article 14(a) the data may no 
longer be processed by the SEO.44 
The ECJ proceeded on the basis that applying Articles 12(b) and 14(a) essentially required 
a balancing of the data subject’s right to privacy against the legitimate economic interests 
of the SEO and the interests of internet users in accessing the information. The ECJ consid-
ered that a name-search is liable to significantly affect the subject’s privacy since it enables 
                                                 
 
39 Ibid, [32]-[40]. 
40 Ibid, [93]-[94]. 
41 Ibid, [73]-[74]. See also AG Opinion, above n27, [95]. 
42 Google Spain, [74]. 
43 Ibid, [75], [95]. 
44 Ibid, [76], [95]. 
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a “more or less detailed profile” to be established with relative ease.45 Given the serious-
ness of this interference, the ECJ was of the view that it could not be justified merely by the 
economic interests of the SEO. As to the interests of internet users in accessing infor-
mation, the ECJ considered that as a general rule those rights were overridden by the data 
subject’s right to privacy. However, the ECJ acknowledged that this balancing would ulti-
mately depend on the nature of the information in question, the sensitivity of the infor-
mation, the subject’s role in public life and the public interest in the information.46 The 
Court concluded that, subject to the appraisal favouring delinking, a SEO is obligated to 
remove the relevant results from a name-search even when the publication is lawful and the 
data will remain on the internet.47 
3.1.6 Summary of the position under the DPD 
In Google Spain, the ECJ recognised in principle that under the DPD a person has a right to 
require delinking from the results of a name-search when the conditions in Articles 12(b) or 
14(a) are met. The Court held that while the existence of this right requires a balancing of 
the conflicting fundamental rights, as a “general rule” the subject’s right to privacy should 
prevail. 
However, the judgment left a number of issues unanswered. In particular, there is consider-
able uncertainty as to how a SEO is to appropriately assess a request for delinking if it is 
not factually analogous to Google Spain. While this issue is explored in Part C, before un-
dertaking that discussion the next subsection introduces the new proposed data regulation, 
the GDPR. 
3.2 The GDPR 
In January 2012 the European Commission proposed reform of the DPD. The proposal 
consisted of a draft Regulation setting out a general EU framework for data protection (the 
                                                 
 
45 Ibid, [80]. 
46 Ibid, [81]. 
47 Ibid, [82]. 
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GDPR), and a draft Directive concerning personal data processing for criminal offences 
and related judicial activities.48 It is the GDPR, which contains provisions concerning the 
right to erasure, which is relevant to this paper. 
The GDPR is in the form of a regulation and does not require transposition;49 following a 
two year transition period after its adoption the regulation has binding legal force within 
each Member State.50 The original Commission proposal was finalised on 25 January 
2012.51 On 12 March 2014, the European Parliament voted in favour of a slightly amended 
version of that proposal.52 The next step is for the amended GDPR to be considered by the 
Council.53 As of November 2014, the Council has not voted on the proposal.  
This subsection will examine whether the GDPR in its current form provides a right to de-
linking, and if it does whether, prima facie, that right is likely to operate in a similar man-
ner to the current position under the DPD. Given the uncertainty involved in the legislative 
process, it would be a fool’s exercise to try and predict with any specificity the final form 
of the instrument. Indeed, given recent amendments by the European Parliament the GDPR 
version currently before the Council is in some aspects materially different from the origi-
nal Commission proposal. Unfortunately, brevity precludes a detailed analysis of both ver-
sions. That being so, as a pragmatic solution this paper will focus on the version approved 
by Parliament on 12 March 2014 since this is the most recent incarnation. However, where 
                                                 
 
48 European Commission, Memo/14/60 – Data Protection Day: Full Speed on EU Data Protection Reform 
(European Commission Memo, European Commission Strasbourg, 27 January 2014) (“Memo/14/60”). 
49 European Commission, Application of EU law – What are EU Regulations? (25 June 2012). Shoor, Emily, 
‘Narrowing the Right to be Forgotten: Why the European Union Needs to Amend the Proposed Data Protec-
tion Regulation’ (2014) 39(1) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 487, 2014, p490. European Commis-
sion, General Data Protection Regulation, (Brussels, 25 January 2012) (“Original GDPR”). 
50 GDPR, above n6, Article 91(2). 
51 European Commission, Press release - Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection 
rules to increase users' control of their data and to cut costs for businesses (25 January 2012).  
52 European Parliament, Press Release – MEPs tighten up rules to protect personal data in the digital era (12 
March 2014) (“EU Parliament Press Release”). 
53 European Commission, Memo/14/186 - Progress on EU data protection reform now irreversible following 
European Parliament vote (European Commission Memo, European Commission Strasbourg, 12 March 
2014). Memo/14/60, above n48. 
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it is instructive to the analysis of this amended version limited regard will be had to the 
original Commission proposal and the reasons for its amendment by Parliament. 
3.2.1 Outline of Article 17 – a right to erasure 
Article 17 is a relatively lengthy provision. For present purposes, the following outline is 
sufficient. Amended Article 17(1) provides that:54 
The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of per-
sonal data relating to them and the abstention from further dissemination of such 
data, and to obtain from third parties the erasure of any links to, or copy or replica-
tion of, that data where one of the following grounds applies... 
The relevant grounds are: per 17(1)(a), the data is no longer necessary; per 17(1)(b), absent 
some other justification, the data subject withdraws their consent; per 17(1)(c), the subject 
objects on the grounds of amended Article 19; per 17(1)(ca), a court or regulatory authority 
has ordered the erasure; per 17(1)(d), the data has been processed unlawfully. 
Amended Article 17(3)(a) requires that the controller, and where applicable third parties, 
carry out erasure without delay unless retention is necessary for exercising the right of 
freedom of expression in accordance with Article 80. The exemptions under Article 80 are 
to be provided for by each Member State.55  
3.2.2 Article 17 and search engine results 
3.2.2.1 “Controller” and “third parties” 
The first issue is whether a SEO is considered a controller under the GDPR and Article 
17(1). The definition of “controller” in the GDPR does not differ materially in any way 
                                                 
 
54 EU Parliament Resolution, above n6, Amendment 112. 
55 With each Member State to notify the Commission of their provisions within two years: see European Par-
liament Resolution, above n6, Amendments 112, 189, Articles 80(2), 91(2). 
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from the DPD.56 Likewise, the GDPR does not contain any distinguishing recitals with re-
spect to the definition. Accordingly, it can be logically reasoned that based on Google 
Spain a SEO is likely to be considered a controller under the GDPR. 
However, because of the reference in amended GDPR Article 17(1) to “third parties”, as 
opposed to the DPD the existence of a right to delinking in the GDPR is not dependant on 
the SEO being considered a controller. And, in view of the definition in amended GDPR 
Article 4(7a),57 it is certainly possible for a SEO be considered a “third party”.  
It is interesting in this respect that the European Parliament considered it necessary to 
amend the original proposal (which did not contemplate erasure from third parties). It is 
possible that the amendment was included in specific contemplation of SEOs as third par-
ties as opposed to controllers, although the rationale for the amendment is unclear. For rea-
sons that will be explored in Part C, there are strong arguments favouring an interpretation 
of SEOs as third parties. 
In any event, irrespective of whether SEOs are considered controllers or third parties it fol-
lows that Article 17 appears to contemplate SEOs within its scope. Indeed, in a recent pub-
lic session of the Justice and Home Affairs Council which specifically considered Article 
17 in light of Google Spain (hereafter referred to as the “JHAC Public Session”), the over-
whelming majority of representatives appeared content with the concept of a right to de-
linking under the GDPR.58 
3.2.2.2 Objection under Article 17(1)(c) 
Given this conclusion that SEOs will come within the scope of amended GDPR Article 
17(1), the next question is whether the subject has a requisite ground under Article 17(1) on 
which to object. With respect to the right to delinking, the relevant ground for objection is 
                                                 
 
56 See EU Parliament Resolution, above n6, amended Article 4(1)(5), and DPD Article 2(d). 
57 EU Parliament Resolution, above n6, Amendment 98. 
58 Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs Council – Public Session, Friday, October 10, 
2014 at 10:10am (Webcast, 10 October 2014) (“JHAC Public Session”), from 51:00 onwards. 
 15 
contained in Article 17(1)(c). This Article gives the subject the right to object to the pro-
cessing on the grounds of amended Article 19.  
Amended Article 19 operates as follows.59 Under GDPR Article 6(1)(f), processing by a 
controller is lawful when it “is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pur-
sued by the controller… except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fun-
damental rights and freedoms of the data subject”. Applying Google Spain, Article 6(1)(f) 
provides the relevant legitimisation for processing by a SEO.60 Where a controller’s pro-
cessing is based on Article 6(1)(f), amended Article 19(2) provides that “the data subject 
shall have at any time and without any further justification, the right to object free of 
charge in general or for any particular purpose…”. Therefore, Article 17(1)(c) read in con-
junction with Article 19 gives a subject an unqualified right to object with respect to pro-
cessing by a SEO. 
3.2.2.3 Exemption under Article 17(3)(a) 
Article 17(3) provides that a SEO, faced with an objection based on Article 17(1)(c), must 
carry out erasure without delay unless retention is necessary for one of several enumerated 
reasons. In the case of a request for delinking, the most relevant exception61 is contained in 
Article 17(3)(a).  
Article 17(3)(a), read in conjunction with amended Article 80, provides an exemption 
where retention of the data is necessary for exercising the right of freedom of expression in 
accordance with the Charter.62 Amended Article 80 broadens the language from the origi-
nal Commission proposal. The original language, which was analogous to that used in the 
                                                 
 
59 EU Parliament Resolution, above n6, Amendment 114. 
60 Article 6(1)(f) is analogous to the DPD ‘legitimate interest’ provision contained in Article 7(f); see Google 
Spain, [73]-[74].  
61 However, it is acknowledged that in certain circumstances the exemption in Article 17(3)(b) concerning 
public health, or 17(3)(c) concerning  “historical, statistical and scientific research purposes”,  could also be 
relevant.  
62 EU Parliament Resolution, above n6, Amendments 112, 189. 
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DPD,63 only mandated an exemption for processing “carried out solely for journalistic pur-
poses or the purpose of artistic or literary expression”. The European Parliament also 
broadened the accompanying Recital 121 in the same manner. The first part of the amended 
Recital 121 now provides:64 
Whenever necessary, exemptions or derogations from the requirements of certain 
provisions of this Regulation for the processing of personal data should be provided 
for in order to reconcile the right to the protection of personal data with the right to 
freedom of expression, and notably the right to receive and impart information… 
In amending the original version and adopting this language, the European Parliament’s 
version appears to stress the importance of reconciling the right to privacy with all forms of 
freedom of expression (that is, not just in the case of journalistic, literary or artistic expres-
sion). Therefore, arguably the amended GDPR contemplates greater deference being given 
to the right to freedom of expression. This interpretation accords with views expressed in 
the recent JHAC Public Session.65 In that session, several representatives expressed con-
cern that Google Spain appeared to grant primacy to the right to privacy, with inadequate 
consideration of the equally important conflicting fundamental rights. 
The second part of amended Recital 121 is also relevant. It provides that:66 
In order to take account of the importance of the right to freedom of expression in 
every democratic society, it is necessary to interpret notions relating to that freedom 
broadly to cover all activities which aim at the disclosure to the public of infor-
mation, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which is used to transmit 
them… They should not be limited to media undertakings and may be undertaken 
for profit-making or for non-profit making purposes. 
                                                 
 
63 See DPD Article 9. 
64 EU Parliament Resolution, above n6, Amendment 83 (emphasis added). 
65 JHAC Public Session, above n58. See, for example, webcast around 52:20 (Luxembourg), 56:00 (France), 
1:00:00 (Germany), 1:04:00 (Poland), 1:26:00 (Estonia). 
66 Emphasis added. 
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Given the vital role of SEOs in disseminating information, potentially this recital provides 
increased scope for exempting their processing from the right to erasure. It could be argued 
that, based on the reference to “all activities which aim at the disclosure” “irrespective of 
medium”, if the processing by the website is justified so too is the processing by the SEO 
as an activity aimed at disclosing that information. 
However, it must be remembered that in Google Spain the ECJ drew a sharp distinction 
between the processing by La Vanguardia and the processing by Google. The Court rea-
soned that as there were two distinct forms of processing, the lawfulness of the former did 
not necessarily mean the latter was also lawful.67 Under this compartmentalised approach, 
whereby the conduct of the website and SEO are considered in relative isolation, notwith-
standing the wording in Recital 121 there is limited scope for drawing a nexus between the 
lawfulness of the website publishing and the processing by the SEO.  
It must also be acknowledged that the GDPR appears to essentially contemplate a balanc-
ing of the competing rights in a manner not dissimilar to that undertaken in Google Spain. 
Indeed, following the decision the European Commission stated that GDPR Article 80 
“…specifically asks for the type of balancing that the Court outlined in its ruling.”68 In this 
respect, it is relevant to recall that in conducting this balance under the DPD the ECJ had 
little difficulty concluding that the data subject’s rights “override, as a rule, not only the 
economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general 
public in finding that information”.69  
In these circumstances it appears reasonable to submit that, prima facie, a materially differ-
ent approach to delinking under the GDPR does not seem likely. However, the complexity 
of how the right might actually operate under the GDPR will be more fully explored in Part 
C. 
                                                 
 
67 Google Spain, [85], [87]. 
68 European Commission, Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten ruling” (C-131/12). See also statements by 
the Commission representative at the JHAC Public Session, above n58, at 49:30, to the effect that the ruling 
in Google Spain confirms the balancing of rights on which the entire GDPR proposal is based. 
69 Google Spain, [97].  
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3.2.2.4 Third party notification and Article 17(2) 
Amended Article 17(2) provides that where a controller has made the data “public without 
a justification based on Article 6(1), it shall take all reasonable steps to have the data 
erased, including by third parties”.70 Under this amended Article, it appears the notification 
obligation is tied to the culpability of the controller who made the data public in the first 
place.71 As discussed above, the lawfulness of processing by a SEO arises under GDPR 
Article 6(1)(f). Therefore, it appears the notification obligation should not attach to SEOs.72 
3.2.3 Summary of the right to delinking under the GDPR 
It is impossible to predict what form Article 17 will ultimately take. However, and having 
established this caveat, it is acknowledged that Article 17 clearly has the support of the 
European Commission who drafted it. Further, the European Parliament approved the 
GDPR by an overwhelming majority of 621 votes to 10, with only minor amendments to 
Article 17.73 And, in the recent JHAC Public Session, the overwhelming majority of Coun-
cil representatives appeared in favour of a right to delinking.74 In these circumstances, it 
appears a right to require delinking will exist under the GDPR. 
                                                 
 
70 In the original version of the GDPR, Recital 54 and Article 17(2) contemplated an obligation on all control-
lers to take “reasonable steps, including technical measures” to inform third parties processing the data that 
the subject had requested erasure: see Original GDPR, above n49. This obligation was poorly considered, 
since it would have been almost impossible for a SEO to comply with it; it would be impractical for the SEO 
to inform every party that had conducted the name-search about the delinking request. 
71 The correct interpretation appears to be that the obligation in Article 17(2) is tied to the lawfulness of the 
original public disclosure. Accordingly, the requisite finding of unlawfulness at the time of the data subject’s 
objection (which may grant the right to erasure), does not apparently enliven Article 17(2). Otherwise the 
reference to “without a justification” in Article 17(2) would be superfluous and nonsensical. See also, Al-
brecht, Jan Philipp, Report A7-0402/2013 (21 November 2013), p201, 300-301. 
72 However, the wording of amended Article 13 is still potentially problematic. It would be appropriate to 
clarify that SEOs do not “transfer” data in providing their search function, although by amending the original 
wording from “disclose” to “transfer” it appears a higher threshold is contemplated. See EU Parliament Reso-
lution, above n6, Amendment 108. 
73 EU Parliament Press Release, above n52. 
74 Albeit, while stressing the importance of balancing competing rights: JHAC Public Session, above n65. 
However, notably the representative for Britain was critical of Google Spain, remarking that it was “Open to 
us, as legislators, to reach a different conclusion”: around 1:16.00.. 
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4 PART C – A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO 
DELINKING 
This section will provide a critical analysis of the right to require delinking from search 
engine results. In view of the discussion in Part B, it is submitted that conceptually the right 
to delinking under the DPD and GDPR are not materially different. Accordingly, the below 
discussion will for the most part proceed without distinction between the two instruments. 
Part C is structured as follows. The discussion will begin by setting out the criteria against 
which the right to delinking will be assessed. With this providing the appropriate basis for a 
critical analysis, the discussion will in turn look at the following four issues: the manner in 
which the framework balances the various conflicting fundamental rights; whether it is 
appropriate for a SEO to be considered a “controller”; the extra-territorial operation of the 
right; and the potential economic implications. 
4.1 Criteria for assessment – privacy, freedom of expression and 
intermediary liability 
In order to critically examine the right to delinking, it is first necessary to outline the basis 
against which it will be assessed. The right to delinking, as set out above, is merely one 
facet of the broader right to erasure. At its core, it is reasonable to submit that the right to 
erasure is concerned with privacy protection. However, the very notion of ‘privacy’ is in-
herently difficult to define,75 and it has been said that “data privacy law has long been af-
flicted by absence of clarity over its aims and conceptual foundation”.76 While a compre-
hensive examination of the rationale for privacy protection is clearly beyond the present 
scope, in short safeguarding privacy serves a range of interests such as personal autonomy, 
                                                 
 
75 Bygrave, Lee, Data Privacy Law – An International Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2014), p119. 
76 Ibid, p117.   
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integrity and dignity, which in turn have broader societal significance.77 And, as already set 
out in Part A, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right in the EU. 
At the same time, as set out in Part A the freedom of expression, to which the right to re-
ceive and impart information are integral, and the freedom to conduct business, are funda-
mental rights in the EU. While brevity precludes a full analysis, these rights are undeniably 
of central importance. For example, freedom of expression is essential to a functioning de-
mocracy, and indispensable for progress in science, law or politics. The freedom to conduct 
business is essential to the free-market ideas that underpin our modern economic model. 
As is clear from Parts A and B, generally the right to delinking cannot be recognised with-
out interfering with the fundamental rights of others. Therefore, the competing fundamental 
rights must be appropriately reconciled with one another. The problem is that, in resolving 
this conflict, there is no formal hierarchy between the fundamental rights and there is no 
objectively indefeasible correct outcome; the world of rights is two-dimensional, and they 
all lie on the same straight line.78 As the representative for France recently stated at the 
JHAC Public Session, “we have to reconcile two things which are rather irreconcilable”.79 
It follows that an assessment of where the appropriate balance lies is inherently coloured by 
what one considers to be the desired outcome, and the trade-offs that one is willing to make 
to reach that outcome. This assessment is, therefore, innately subjective in nature.  
That being the case, it is perhaps not surprising that views on the right to erasure vary dra-
matically. On the one hand, the right can be seen as a valuable tool to temper the modern 
“flawless digital memory”.80 In this sense, recognition of the right is justified because it is a 
socially beneficial means to facilitate individuals reforming their lives without the continu-
                                                 
 
77 Ibid, p119-120. 
78 House of Lords European Union Committee, EU Data Protection law: a ‘right to be forgotten’? Evidence 
(July 2014), Professor Luciano Floridi, p19. 
79 JHAC Public Session, above n58, around 55:00 onwards. 
80 Kulevska, Sanna, Humanizing the Digital Age: A Right to be Forgotten Online? – An EU-U.S. Compara-
tive Study of Tomorrow’s Privacy in Light of the General Data Protection Regulation and Google Spain v. 
AEPD (LLM Graduate Thesis, Lund University, May 2014), p1.  
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ous burden of their past mistakes.81 On the other hand the right to erasure, as a right which 
limits society’s access to truthful, valuable, publicly available information, is so repugnant 
to freedom of expression that its existence should not be recognised. To some this dis-
course has particular authority in the context of the internet, since the internet is an im-
mensely important, widely accessible, non-discriminatory resource which magnifies and 
facilitates in an unprecedented manner the efficient dissemination of valuable infor-
mation.82 
In the context of the internet, a further complication arises in this debate in the form of in-
termediary liability. Since many internet intermediaries do not actively control the content 
they store, transmit or make accessible, and in view of the large quantities of information 
with which they deal, there is an established notion that such intermediaries should not face 
the same level of responsibility as traditional publishers. Otherwise, the expansion of the 
internet and freedom of expression would be improperly threatened.83 This principle is rec-
ognised in the EU,84 although opinions differ as to how the activities of SEOs fit within the 
concept of internet intermediaries.85 Given the present scope, a full analysis is inappropri-
ate. The limited point to take away is that, broadly speaking, the very concept of regulating 
SEOs involves complex questions concerning the regulation of online intermediaries.  
The purpose of the above (albeit superficial) discussion is to highlight that at its heart any 
assessment of the right to erasure is intrinsically complex, involving broad fundamental 
value judgements about how the right to privacy, freedom of expression and freedom of 
business should be legally balanced; a discussion which is, in itself, a topic of academic 
scholarship and entirely inappropriate in view of the present scope. Therefore, caution must 
                                                 
 
81 Baker, Michael and Alan Westin, Databanks in a Free Society; Computers, Record-Keeping, and Privacy 
(1972, Quadrangle Books), p267. Kulevska, above n80, p7. Peltz-Steele, Richard, 'Right to be forgotten' is 
effectively a right to be forgiven, The Sydney Morning Herald (Online) 24 November 2014. 
82 See generally: AG Opinion, above n27, [28]. Alsenoy, above n2, p5. 
83 Alsenoy, above n2, p58. 
84 See, for example, European Commission, ‘Directive 2000/31/EC’ (17 July 2000) No. 178 Official Journal 
of the European Union 1-16. See also, Alsenoy, above n2, p58-63. 
85 Alsenoy, above n2, p63. 
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be exercised to avoid becoming improperly entangled in analysis of such a fundamental 
tension. 
Therefore, for present purposes this paper will adopt the following pragmatic approach. It 
will be accepted that SEOs pose a serious threat to the right to privacy, but it will equally 
be accepted that SEOs are potentially champions of the right to freedom of expression.86 
That being so, the discussion will not seek to argue in principle that the right to delinking is 
inherently repugnant or inherently desirable. Rather, the present critical analysis will focus 
on the manner in which the right actually operates. As such, the analysis will concentrate 
on the extent to which the right provides an acceptable framework for balancing the con-
flicting fundamental rights, and can be applied in a practical, equitable, efficient and certain 
manner. 
4.2 Balancing the competing interests 
As outlined above, under both the DPD and GDPR the existence of a right to delinking 
essentially requires that the SEO balance the subject’s right to privacy against the conflict-
ing fundamental rights of the other affected parties. There are two main problems that arise 
from this operation; how to strike the appropriate balance, and whether it is appropriate for 
a SEO to make this decision. This subsection will consider these two issues in turn. 
4.2.1 Google on a tightrope 
As introduced in Part B, the DPD and GDPR differ as to the mechanics of how the right to 
delinking actually operates. As such, given the focus of this subsection it is appropriate to 
discuss each instrument separately.  
4.2.1.1 The DPD 
This section will examine, in turn, the following three issues arising under the DPD: 
whether the ECJ in Google Spain inappropriately gave primacy to the right to privacy; 
                                                 
 
86 Alsenoy, above n2, p5. 
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whether the DPD, in view of Google Spain, provides an adequate framework for SEOs to 
assess delinking requests; how the right to delinking might operate with respect to non-
name-searches. 
4.2.1.1.1 Google Spain – a knock out for privacy? 
The focus of this subsection is whether the ECJ in Google Spain demonstrated an inappro-
priate preference for privacy protection over other fundamental rights. However, before 
turning to the specific concerns about the judgment it is necessary to explore in more detail 
how the right to delinking impacts on the rights of the various parties.  
With respect to the data subject, their right to privacy is protected by the right because 
without it a name-search may allow any internet user to obtain “a more or less detailed pro-
file” of them with relative ease.87 On the other hand, delinking may interfere with the rights 
to freedom of expression and business enjoyed by SEOs, internet users and website pub-
lishers. For a SEO, their activity of providing the search function and selling advertising 
are in principle protected by their right to freedom of expression and business.88 For inter-
net users, search engines facilitate the retrieval of information. When a user enters a name-
search, they are actively exercising their right to find information about that subject. If the 
search results are altered, that user’s right is interfered with.89 For website publishers, their 
right to freedom of expression and business generally protects their right to publish lawful 
content and have that content disseminated by SEOs. If links to their webpages are re-
moved from search results, their rights are interfered with.90  
                                                 
 
87 Google Spain, [80]. 
88 There is a line of argument that in publishing search results SEOs are exercising their right to expression, 
and therefore deserve the relevant protection. See: Alsenoy, above n2, p50-51; AG Opinion, above n27, 
[132]. This argument has found favour in the US as a means for SEOs to obtain protection from liability un-
der the first amendment. See, Stuart, above n2, p487-490.  
89 Alsenoy, above n2, p50. AG Opinion, above n27, [121], [130]-[131].  
90 AG Opinion, above n27, [122]. 
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In striving to protect privacy by establishing the right to delinking, it must be examined 
whether the right to delinking is relevant, efficient and proportionate91 to the legitimate 
privacy aims pursued.92 The concern is that, based on the approach in Google Spain, the 
right to delinking might operate in a way that does not respect these criteria, and does not 
therefore strike an appropriate balance between the conflicting fundamental rights. In this 
respect, the apprehension arises because arguably the ECJ demonstrated an inappropriate 
preference for protecting the right to privacy without proper consideration of the competing 
rights; a concern which was recently raised by a number of representatives at the JHAC 
Public Session.93 This subsection will examine four particular aspects of the Court’s deci-
sion which are potentially troubling. 
The first area of concern arises from the Court’s statement that, given the “potential seri-
ousness” of the interference with privacy caused by a name-search, “it is clear that it cannot 
be justified merely by the economic interest” of the SEO.94 The issue here is why the mere 
potential for a serious interference is sufficient. In providing its search function the SEO is 
exercising its fundamental rights to both freedom of expression and business.95 As set out 
above, in reconciling these rights against the subject’s right to privacy there is no formal 
hierarchy, and the appropriate balance should be struck on a case-by-case basis.96 There-
fore, prima facie it appears inappropriate for the ECJ to de facto subrogate the SEO’s fun-
damental rights. Adherence to the principle of proportionality should require consideration 
of whether, on the facts, there is an actual serious interference or risk of a serious interfer-
ence. Indeed, depending on the relevant facts this may not always be the case.97 
                                                 
 
91 The principle of proportionality is generally considered to have three limbs; suitability, necessity and non-
excessiveness. See Bygrave, above n75, p148.  
92 Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, ECtHR Case no. 35841/02, 7 December 2006, [62]. See also, Alse-
noy, above n2, p70. 
93 JHAC Public Session, above n65. 
94 Google Spain, [81]. 
95 AG Opinion, above n27, [132]. Alsenoy, above n2, p57. 
96 Alsenoy, above n2, p66. 
97 For example, and discussed in the next subsection, where the data subject has a particularly common name. 
 25 
The second area of concern arises from the Court’s statement that “as a general rule” the 
rights of the data subject override those of the internet user. Arguably, the reference to a 
“general rule” is inappropriate (even though it was qualified by the Court).98 Again, as 
there is no hierarchy between the competing rights it does not seem appropriate to assume 
the balance lies in favour of the data subject; the conflicting rights should be reconciled 
depending on the facts of the case.99  
In considering the rights of the internet user, it is important to remember that their right to 
freedom of expression includes the right to receive information. As the AG commented, 
when an internet user performs a name-search that user “is actively using his right to re-
ceive information concerning the data subject from public sources for reasons known only 
to him”.100 The AG continued by noting that, in the contemporary information society, per-
forming a search online is “one of the most important ways to exercise that fundamental 
right”.101 In this author’s opinion, the AG’s comments hold particular significance. An in-
ternet user performing a name-search is actively exercising their right to find publicly 
available information about that person, for reasons which might be entirely legitimate and 
extremely important to that user. To the extent those search results are compromised by 
delinking, this might potentially constitute a serious interference with that user’s right to 
receive the information they are searching for. That being so, it seems entirely improper for 
the ECJ to succinctly conclude that given the “potential seriousness” of the interference to 
the data subject, the subject’s rights “as a general rule” override those of the internet user. 
Such a presumption represents an unjustified value judgment that the potential interference 
with the data subject is more serious than the potential interference with the internet user. 
Rather, the determination should depend on the facts of the particular case, and it is inap-
propriate to commence such analysis with a presumption in favour of one party. 
                                                 
 
98 Google Spain, [81], and see also at [97], [99]. 
99 However, it is acknowledged that the matter was ultimately left for the referring court, albeit with the ECJ 
providing its view that “in the case in point there do not appear to be particular reasons substantiating a pre-
ponderant interest of the public in having, in the context of such a search, access to that information…”: 
Google Spain, [98].  
100 AG Opinion, above n27, [130] (emphasis original). 
101 Ibid, [131]. 
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The third area of concern relates to the ECJ’s statement that the existence of the right to 
delinking does not require a finding that the relevant search results cause prejudice to the 
data subject.102 Whether this comment is controversial depends upon its intended meaning. 
If the Court merely intended to establish that a factual finding of prejudice is not a criterion 
for applying the right, the statement is inoffensive; it is well-established that protection of 
privacy, as a fundamental right, is not conditional on prejudice. However, it is also possible 
to interpret the Court’s comments as suggesting that the privacy interests of the data subject 
are to be favoured. This is because, in balancing the competing interests, the restrictions on 
freedom of expression must be relevant and proportionate to the legitimate privacy aims 
pursued by the subject; an analysis that demands consideration of the subjective privacy 
implications for the subject. Therefore, in short it is relevant to the requisite balancing 
whether the subject suffers prejudice. Ultimately, the judgment is unclear as to which inter-
pretation was intended by the Court. Since the Court gave specific consideration at para-
graph 98 to the impact on Mr Gonzalez from the “sensitive” La Vanguardia articles, it can 
be reasoned that the former interpretation was intended. However, arguably it would have 
been beneficial for the Court to clarify that prejudice to the data subject, while not strictly 
required, should be taken into account in balancing the relevant interests. 
The fourth issue with the approach taken by the ECJ arises from the Court’s failure to 
acknowledge the website publisher’s right to freedom of expression and business.103 When 
a person lawfully publishes an article online about a data-subject, that person is actively 
invoking their right to disseminate information about that subject. In the modern age, one 
aspect of this right is the potential to have the article included in the results of a name-
                                                 
 
102 Google Spain, [96], [99]. 
103 On a strict interpretation of the DPD there is some uncertainty as to whether the Court was required to take 
the publishers’ interests into account. Under DPD Article 7(f) regard is to be had to the legitimate interests of 
the SEO (controller) and parties to who the data are disclosed (internet users). Accordingly the assessment 
does not, strictly speaking, contemplate that the impact on the fundamental rights of other parties (in this case 
publishers) be taken into account. However, it can be reasonably argued that based on the principle of propor-
tionality these interests should be taken into consideration. As to proportionality, see Bodil Lindqvist, ECJ 
Case no. C-101/01, [89]. Indeed, the AG’s opinion included consideration of the interests of the website pub-
lishers; see AG Opinion, above n27, [122]. 
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search about the subject.104 While the rights of the publisher may be overridden by the pri-
vacy rights of the subject, those conflicting rights must actually be balanced. In the circum-
stances of Google Spain, this exercise would not likely have had material affect; given the 
relevant newspaper articles concerned announcements of a property sale 16 years ago, it 
would not be controversial to find that La Vanguardia’s right to have those articles dissem-
inated in the name-search were overridden by the privacy interests of Mr Gonzalez. How-
ever, arguably it was inappropriate that the Court failed to acknowledge that, depending on 
the facts of the case, consideration should be given to the publisher’s rights. Indeed, in cer-
tain circumstances the rights of the publisher may strongly mitigate against delinking.105 
In view of the above, it can be reasonably argued that the approach adopted by the ECJ in 
Google Spain was in some respects less than ideal. While the Court did not necessarily 
reach the wrong conclusion on the facts,106 the method it adopted suggests an inappropriate 
preference for the rights of the data subject. Contrary to the impression given by the Court, 
the various conflicting rights should be treated equally, with a determination made on the 
facts of the case. The next section explores the difficulties that arise for SEOs in applying 
this framework. 
4.2.1.1.2 Applying the current framework 
It has been a common theme of this paper that the application of the right to delinking es-
sentially turns on a balancing of the various fundamental rights involved. The difficulty of 
reconciling these conflicting rights is itself a scholarly topic, and one to which this subsec-
tion will not attempt to make a comprehensive addition. Rather, the present discussion will 
merely examine some specific difficulties that arise in assessing a delinking request.  
In view of the preceding subsection, for a SEO assessing a delinking request there is a de-
gree of uncertainty as to whether it is entitled to proceed on the basis of the “general rule” 
                                                 
 
104 Assuming the publisher has not made use of an exclusion code. See AG Opinion, above n27, [41], [122]. 
105 An issue which is explored in the next subsection. 
106 Although that may certainly be the opinion of some, perhaps most notably the AG. 
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in favour of the data subject, or whether the assessment demands an individual examination 
of the particular facts. In this respect, this paper submits that the precedential effect of 
Google Spain should be limited to the facts in which it was decided, namely an application 
by a non-public figure about prejudicial, outdated and reasonably irrelevant information. 
For delinking requests in an analogous factual context, prima facie it seems reasonable for 
the privacy interests of the subject to prevail. Therefore, in such cases it should be relative-
ly easy for a SEO to assess a delinking request. However, where the circumstances are not 
analogous the appropriate approach is less certain. In such a case, this paper submits that 
the suitable balance must be assessed based on the particular facts. 
As discussed above, the ECJ proceeded on the basis that given the “potential seriousness” 
of the interference of a name-search there is essentially a presumption in favour of the data 
subject. The problem is that, in certain cases, there simply may not be such a risk of a seri-
ous interference. One such situation is where the subject has a particularly common name. 
For example a name-search on google.de for “Ben Müller”, the most common name in 
Germany,107 produces over 32million search results.108 In those circumstances, it seems 
unreasonable to assume that, prima facie, the nature of that name-search would constitute a 
serious interference for the particular applicant. Contrary to the view of the ECJ, in such a 
case it seems unlikely that the name-search would “establish a more or less detailed pro-
file” of the relevant Ben Müller. Rather, any personal data about the particular applicant 
would likely exist in a disordered manner, littered amongst vast amounts of other personal 
information about individuals with the same name. Alternatively, even if a name-search 
does provide a “detailed profile” the interference may not be serious if the relevant results 
are difficult to locate; for example, if the relevant information on the particular Ben Müller 
exists after the 31st million result.109 In these cases, the principle of proportionality de-
mands a more critical assessment of the request for delinking. 
                                                 
 
107 According to Wikipedia. 
108 As at 28 November 2014. 
109 Of particular relevance, evidence suggests internet users generally have little interest in looking beyond 
the first page of search results. See Stuart, above n2, p475. 
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There is also a concern as to how a SEO is to apply the qualifying criteria from Google 
Spain. It will be recalled from Part B that although a data subject’s rights “override, as a 
general rule” those of internet users, the appropriate balance ultimately depends on the na-
ture of the information, its sensitivity to the subject, the publics’ interest in the information 
and the role played by the subject in public life.110 While the succinct reference to these 
criteria is not particularly instructive, the following comment by the ECJ is even less en-
lightening:111 
…it should inter alia be examined whether the data subject has a right that the in-
formation in question relating to him personally should, at this point in time, no 
longer be linked to his name by a list of results displayed following a search made 
on the basis of his name… 
These criteria are extremely subjective in nature, and require the SEO to make complicated 
value judgments about the merits of the application.112 While SEOs and the A29 Working 
Party are currently developing guidelines,113 for the time being the vague criteria provided 
by the ECJ offer little assistance. 
There are also potential complications in balancing the rights of website publishers. One 
such scenario is where the subject is seeking delinking of a sponsored link.114 In such a 
case, the publisher has actively exercised their rights to freedom of expression and business 
in paying for the link to appear, and the SEO has a particular economic interest in the 
                                                 
 
110 Google Spain, [81], and see also [97], [99]. 
111 Google Spain, [96], [99]. 
112 Depending on the circumstances, one difficulty with the assessment is the potential for it to be inherently 
paradoxical. For example, that a subject is requesting delinking of certain “irrelevant” information can in 
itself be seen as indicative that the information is likely relevant to someone else. Otherwise, what is the point 
of the request? However, this reasoning will not apply in all situations; for example, with respect to infor-
mation which is merely embarrassing (such as nude photographs).   
113 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Press Release 6 June 2014 (Brussels). 
114 This scenario is most likely to arise in the case of a name-search about a celebrity. In such a case, maga-
zines or newspapers may invest in sponsored links so that their articles (personal data) about that person are 
listed first. See Stuart, above n2, p487-487. 
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maintenance of that link. Therefore, in such a delinking request there is a unique set of 
competing rights which must be taken into consideration.  
Another scenario in which it may be particularly difficult to reconcile the rights of the sub-
ject with those of the publisher is where the relevant publisher has a unique justification for 
having their website linked to the name-search. While this may potentially arise in many 
respects – for example, a negative client review about a professional advisor – the nature of 
the principle is best demonstrated in an example where the publisher is a victim of a crime 
perpetrated by the data subject.115 Depending on the nature of the crime and when it oc-
curred, applying the criteria in Google Spain it may be difficult to justify disclosure based 
on the interests of internet users – the information is likely to be particularly sensitive to the 
subject, and if the crime occurred a long time ago and re-offence is unlikely, there is lim-
ited public interest in access. However, the right to freedom of expression held by the vic-
tim publisher may strongly mitigate against delinking; for example, if the subject has re-
cently chosen to write an article about the ongoing impact of the crime. It is not the inten-
tion of the present discussion to make a value judgment about the merits of delinking in 
such a case; as set out at the beginning of this Part C, this critical analysis is concerned with 
the operation of the right. Rather, the point being made is that in certain circumstances it 
may be difficult for a SEO to disregard the fundamental rights of the website publisher. 
4.2.1.1.3 Non-name searches 
Although the matter is subject to uncertainty,116 applying the Court’s approach in Google 
Spain it is in principle legally possible that a subject could require delinking of results in a 
non-name-search. In such a search, the SEO would still be a “controller” of the relevant 
processing.117 To the extent the presentation of the data in the search results is, inter alia, 
                                                 
 
115 Indeed, the very concept of a ‘right to be forgotten’ has traditionally found favour in this context, such as 
the French doctrine of “droit à l’oublie”: see Kulevska, above n80, p21; Shoor, above n49, p492. 
116 Google Spain did not contemplate delinking from a non-name-search. To date, Google is not granting 
delinking with respect to non-name-searches, but will delink results from composite-name-searches. See 
Fleischer, Peter, Submissions by Google to the Article 29 Working Party (31 July 2014), p8-9. 
117 See Google Spain, [28], [33]. 
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inaccurate, irrelevant or excessive, conceptually the subject could object to the processing 
for non-compliance with the DPD. 
In such a case, a question arises as to how the delinking request should be assessed. Com-
pared to a name-search, the relevant distinction with a non-name-search is that the internet 
user is actively exercising their right to find information about a certain topic. With respect 
to the name-search in Google Spain, the ECJ stated that “in the case in point there do not 
appear to be particular reasons substantiating a preponderant interest of the public in hav-
ing, in the context of such a [name] search, access to that information”.118 By comparison, 
the context for a non-name-search is different; the user actively wants to find information 
about a certain topic. Therefore, that user is not directly trying to invade the subject’s pri-
vacy per se, but rather any such invasion is a mere indirect incidence of the user’s underly-
ing factual pursuit. To the extent those search results are compromised, that may potentially 
constitute a significant interference with that user’s right to receive accurate and relevant 
information about the specific topic. Accordingly, arguably in the context of a non-name-
search there is a more preponderant interest in the user having the information.119 
4.2.1.2 The GDPR 
As set out in Part B, it is difficult to assess the manner in which the right to delinking might 
operate under the GDPR because the final form of Article 17 remains uncertain. However, 
with this caveat established, it was concluded that since under both the DPD and GDPR the 
existence of the right appears to essentially turn on a balancing of competing fundamental 
rights, prima facie it seems likely that the right under the GDPR will operate in a similar to 
the DPD. Therefore, the discussion in the preceding subsection concerning the operation of 
the DPD can for the most part be considered equally applicable to the GDPR. That said, in 
                                                 
 
118 Google Spain, [98] (emphasis added). 
119 This reasoning is, in principle, equally applicable in the context of a composite-name-search. However, a 
composite-name-search potentially represents a more serious interference with the privacy interests of the 
subject, in that it may be more likely to allow identification of the particular individual. One study found that 
87 per cent of people in the US could be identified by a search using postal code, date of birth and sex. See: 
Ohm, Paul, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymisation’ (2010) 57 
UCLA Law Review 1701, p1705; Kuner, above n7, p11. 
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view of the unique nature of the GDPR this section will provide a limited number of addi-
tional comments. 
As discussed in Part B, the operation of GDPR Article 17(1) potentially provides an un-
qualified right to request delinking by a SEO, constrained by application of the exemption 
for freedom of expression in Article 17(3)(a). At least at one level, this creates a conceptu-
ally different framework compared to the DPD.120 Under the DPD, it is possible to identify 
two distinct grounds for delinking arising from Articles 12(b) and 14(a). The first ground 
concerns erasure based on non-compliance with Article 6(1) because the processing is, in-
ter alia, inaccurate, irrelevant or excessive.121 The second ground concerns erasure based on 
non-compliance with Article 7(f) because the legitimate interests of the SEO are overridden 
by the fundamental rights of the data subject.122 By comparison to this operation in the 
DPD, strictly speaking these two grounds are irrelevant under the GDPR; by reason of the 
unqualified right to request delinking, the request must be complied with unless retention is 
necessary for exercising the right to freedom of expression under Article 17(3)(a). There-
fore, the approach under the GDPR is in some respects conceptually different – the focus is 
on freedom of expression, and it does not have the DPD’s explicit emphasis on the actual 
nature of the processing or the legitimate interests of the actual SEO as against the data 
subject.  
It is unclear whether this conceptual difference might impact on the operation of the GDPR 
in practice. GDPR Article 17(3)(a) certainly contemplates that the conflicting interests be 
balanced, and this balancing should mostly entail consideration of the same issues that cur-
rently arise under the DPD. Indeed, compared to the uncertainty that exists under the 
DPD,123 the broad reference to freedom of expression appears to explicitly permit consider-
ation of the right to freedom of expression held by SEOs and website publishers. On the 
                                                 
 
120 Mitchell-Rekrut, Cooper, ‘Search Engine liability under the LIBE Data Regulation Proposal’ (2014) 45 
Georgetown Journal of International Law 862, p879. 
121 Available under Article 12(b). 
122 Available under Article 12(b) and Article 14(a). 
123 See above n95, n103. 
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other hand, the GDPR only explicitly contemplates balancing freedom of expression. This 
raises a question whether the legitimate business interests of SEOs or website publishers 
are to be considered. However, in this respect it is relevant that all EU laws are to be inter-
preted in view of the Charter,124 which would involve consideration of the right to freedom 
of business. Furthermore, the doctrine of proportionality should demand consideration of 
the circumstances of the case.125 This would include, inter alia, the economic impact of the 
delinking on the SEO and website publisher, and whether the actual search results were 
inadequate, excessive or no longer relevant. Therefore, ultimately the operation of the right 
under the GDPR may not be materially different to the DPD. 
The final matter for consideration is that, under amended Article 17(3)(a) read in conjunc-
tion with Article 80, it is up to each Member State to provide the relevant exemption for 
freedom of expression. A concern here is that differing laws across Member States may 
jeopardise the Regulation’s goal of harmonisation.126 While it is unclear to what extent the 
ECJ will grant Member States a margin of appreciation in drafting the exemptions,127 the 
history of implementing EU Directives suggests that in some cases there are likely to be 
material differences across different countries. If that is the case, the Californian company 
Google Inc will have to inform itself of any nuances across the individual freedom of ex-
pression laws of 28 different Member States. Indeed, it appears Google is already grappling 
with this problem.128 This hardly creates a harmonised data protection framework, and po-
tentially imposes significant compliance costs on SEOs, creates barriers to entry129 and 
jeopardises the realisation of the single market. 
                                                 
 
124 See, for example: Charter, Article 52; Lindqvist, above n103, [87]. 
125 Lindqvist, above n103, [89]. 
126 Shoor, above n49, p504. 
127 It is acknowledged that the various exemptions will need to respect the spirit of the regulation in accord-
ance with the principle of proportionality: see Lindqvist, above n103, [87]. 
128 Google’s application form for lodging a request for delinking requires the applicant to “select a country so 
that we [Google] know which law to apply”: see Fleischer, above n116, p2. 
129 See below, n182. 
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4.2.2 Should Google be the ringmaster? 
In view of the above, assessing a request for delinking is a complex process that involves 
balancing a complicated distillation of competing fundamental rights. The complexity of 
this assessment, and the potential for divergence in opinion, is self-evident from the diver-
gent views of the ECJ in Google Spain and the opinion of the AG. This raises a serious 
question as to whether a SEO, as a commercial entity, is capable of adequately performing 
this complex exercise.130 
The nature of the problem is heightened by the SEO’s self interest in the outcome. While 
these matters are more fully explored below, in short complying with a delinking request 
imposes a direct and indirect cost on a SEO. On the other hand, incorrectly denying a re-
quest may also be extremely costly. Irrespective of the bias in the particular case, the im-
portant point is that a SEO is not an impartial adjudicator; ‘no-one should be a judge in his 
own cause’. To some extent, this partiality may not be a significant concern for the data 
subject; if a subject feels a request was incorrectly denied, that subject can lodge an appli-
cation with the relevant data protection authority. However, this partiality does potentially 
present a concern for the protection of freedom of expression. As a delinking request is a 
private matter between the SEO and subject, a request may be granted without notice to the 
relevant website publisher.131 Furthermore, internet users are only aware of the delinking to 
the extent the name-search results indicate that they have been edited.132 In these circum-
stances, the appropriate operation of the framework is extremely reliant on the potentially 
biased SEO conducting the assessment properly. Prima facie, this does not seem like an 
ideal regulatory model. 
                                                 
 
130 House of Lords European Union Committee, EU Data Protection law: a ‘right to be forgotten’? (2nd 
Report of Session 2014–15, Paper 40, 30 July 2014) (“HOL Report”), [56]. Kuner, above n7, p26. 
131 Some commentators have noted that the ex-parte nature of this operation raises issues concerning a denial 
of natural justice for the publisher: see Brown, Ian (ed.), Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet 
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132 A practice which Google does implement: Fleischer, above n116, p10. 
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A concern that follows from this operation is the potential for SEOs to remove search re-
sults without properly considering the merits of the request.133 A number of factors give 
rise to this potential problem. The cost of ‘blindly’ complying with a request is likely to be 
minimal; a direct technical cost in removing the link, and a potential indirect cost in the 
form of the reduced custom. By comparison, the cost of fully assessing a request may be 
high; the potential complexity of balancing the competing interests was discussed above.134 
In the event the request is wrongly denied, the potential costs are even higher in the form of 
litigation costs and potential sanctions.135 The net effect of the above is the propensity for 
the right to delinking to result in a practice of ‘blind takedowns’;136 for a SEO, ‘if in doubt, 
take it out’. Such an outcome is inherently undesirable, as noted by the representative for 
Belgium at the recent JHAC Public Session:137 
There is a real risk, and it is not a negligible risk, that controllers, and in particular 
search engines, may decide to erase data in most cases, and that wouldn’t be a de-
sirable outcome. 
In this respect, it is useful to recall George Orwell’s famous words in Nineteen Eighty-
Four; “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the 
past”.138 In recognition of the potential for abuse, it is submitted that the framework needs 
to implement greater measures to ensure that important information is not inappropriately 
censored by those with a self-serving interest.139 For example, during his infamous life 
                                                 
 
133 However, to date it appears Google has been viewing delinking requests with reasonable scepticism. Ac-
cording to the Telegraph, as at October 2014 only 41.8 per cent of requested URLs have been removed. See 
‘What people are asking to be removed from Google searches’, The Telegraph (online) 13 October 2014. See 
also, Fleischer, p11. Furthermore, in balancing the competing interests it appears Google is having regard to a 
wide range of relevant interests: See Fleischer, above n116, p4-5. 
134 Especially in the case of a ‘borderline’ request for delinking. See also, Alsenoy, above n 2, p65. In the case 
of the GDPR the problem is potentially even worse. Because the subject has an unqualified right to object and 
does not (compared to the DPD) need to, inter alia, provide “compelling legitimate grounds”, it may be par-
ticularly hard for a SEO to assess the merits of the objection. 
135 Shoor, above n49, p505, 507. 
136 Shoor, above n49, p512. See also Alsenoy, above n2, p64-65, 69. 
137 JHAC Public Session, above n58, around 1:11.20. 
138 Orwell, George, Nineteen Eighty-Four (2003, Penguin Books), p284. 
139 On this point, compare the opinion of Alsenoy, above n2, p72. 
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(1882-1949) Charles Ponzi committed numerous financial frauds in different jurisdictions, 
unimpeded by his long criminal history; after serving a custodial sentence in one state, he 
would simply move to another where his past indiscretions were unknown.140 In recognis-
ing the right to delinking, caution must be exercised such that the utility of a name-search 
as a means to restrain the Charles Ponzis of the world is not inappropriately restrained. In 
this respect, Google has noted its reliance on the information provided by the applicant and 
that in some cases the requests have been based on “false and inaccurate information”.141 
To ensure freedom of expression remains adequately protected, the operation of the current 
framework should be closely scrutinised to ensure the right to delinking is not being 
abused.142 
4.3 Search engines and “controllers” 
As set out in Part B, based on Google Spain it appears settled that SEOs act as controllers 
when processing data in a name-search. With respect to the GDPR, the definition of con-
troller is not materially different to the DPD in any way. Therefore, applying Google Spain 
it is possible that under the GDPR SEOs will also be considered controllers. However, in 
the GDPR the right to delinking is not contingent on this determination, since SEOs could 
potentially come within the scope of amended Article 17 as “third parties”. Accordingly, it 
is unclear how SEOs might be classified under the GDPR. 
This section critically examines the concept of a SEO as a controller. In particular, the dis-
cussion will look at two main issues. Firstly, whether it is possible for a SEO to physically 
comply with the various obligations that are imposed on data controllers. Secondly, even if 
compliance is possible, whether the outcome is appropriate. 
In view of the uncertainty as to how SEOs will be treated under the GDPR, in the event 
SEOs are deemed to be controllers the below discussion is applicable to both the DPD and 
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additional safeguards to mitigate the risk of excessive takedowns.” 
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GDPR. However, given the issues which will be explored this paper submits that there are 
strong arguments for SEOs to be treated as “third parties” under Article 17. 
4.3.1 Can a SEO comply with the obligations on controllers? 
Both the DPD and GDPR impose a number of obligations on controllers. Given the manner 
in which SEOs function, there is a question as to whether a SEO can reasonably comply 
with these obligations. While for present purposes it is unnecessary to outline the various 
obligations in detail, they are reasonably onerous and require, inter alia, that controllers: 
process data according to certain standards, including that the processing is fair and lawful, 
and adequate, relevant and not excessive;143 process data legitimately, based on listed crite-
ria such as consent;144 only process certain ‘sensitive’ data in limited circumstances;145 
generally ensure the processing contains adequate levels of security;146 generally provide 
data subjects with certain information concerning the processing;147 grant data subjects a 
right of access to specific detailed information concerning the relevant processing.148  
As to the ability to comply with these obligations, the principal concern for a SEO stems 
from the fact that for the most part they passively process the personal data in automated 
systems, and do not exercise control over the data on the indexed website.149 It is argued 
that such a modus operandi is at odds with the notion of a SEO as a controller, since on its 
proper interpretation the idea of a controller should be seen as a functional concept which is 
intended to allocate responsibility where the factual influence is150 – the various obligations 
imposed on controllers contemplate the controller as an entity aware of the specific data 
processing that is taking place.151 So, for example, in his opinion in Google Spain the AG 
                                                 
 
143 See DPD Article 6; GDPR, Article 5. 
144 See DPD Article 7; GDPR, Article 6. 
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146 See DPD Articles 16-17; GDPR, Articles 30-32. 
147 See DPD Articles 10-11; GDPR, Articles 11-14. 
148 See DPD Article 12; GDPR, Article 15. 
149 See generally, AG Opinion, above n27, [80]-[90]. 
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sor” (16 February 2010), p9. AG Opinion, above n27, [83], [88]. Alsenoy, above n2, p14-19. 
151 AG Opinion, above n27, [82]-[83]. Google Spain, [22]. 
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concluded that a SEO “cannot in law or in fact fulfil the obligations of controller provided 
in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Directive in relation to the personal data” on third party web-
sites.152  
On the other hand, it is relevant that both the DPD and GDPR allow for considerable flexi-
bility in their application. Both instruments contain a number of explicit exemptions, which 
allow for derogations from obligations where strict compliance would be disproportionate 
or unreasonable. Absent such exemptions, the principle of proportionality provides a basis 
for tailoring the obligations to the particular circumstances.153 By applying either specific 
exemptions or the principle of proportionality, arguably it is possible for SEOs to comply 
with the various controller obligations. For present purposes it is unnecessary to specifical-
ly examine how every obligation can be so reconciled – that exercise has been undertaken 
in a paper by Alsenoy154 – the important point is that it is at least possible. 
4.3.2 Is it appropriate to treat a SEO as a controller? 
Having established that SEOs may be able to fulfil the obligations of a controller, a ques-
tion remains as to whether this outcome is appropriate. An issue arises because, in some 
instances, it is a relatively complex and convoluted process to reconcile the controller obli-
gations with the manner in which SEOs operate.155 In such cases, there is a concern that the 
relevant obligations risk becoming ‘empty shells’ – if a reasonable interpretation of a 
                                                 
 
152 AG Opinion, above n27, [89]. 
153 Alsenoy, above n2, p28. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of 
personal data (20 June 2007) (“A29 Opinion 4/2007”), p4-5. 
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SEO’s obligations as a controller de facto exempts them from (proactively) complying with 
several key principles, this could undermine the nature of the framework as a whole.156   
The European Commission’s response to this concern appears to be that a SEO’s obliga-
tions should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in the context of specific requests.157 To 
this effect, Google Spain can be seen as a decision specifically concerned with the right to 
require delinking, and does not therefore have broader implications such that a SEO must 
immediately comply with all controller obligations. Despite its convenience, the problem 
with this approach is that it creates considerable legal uncertainty for SEOs as to what their 
obligations actually are. While over time further guidance may become available, for ex-
ample in the form of ECJ judgments or opinions of the Article 29 Working Party, in the 
interim period this situation is arguably unsatisfactory. 
The general nature of this problem arises because of the broad language used in the DPD. 
Indeed, given the broad definition of “controller” it is difficult at one level to criticise the 
judgment in Google Spain as legally incorrect; SEOs do satisfy the relevant criteria for a 
controller at least in a formal sense.158 However, arguably this result is merely the product 
of EU regulation; operating as supra legislation, EU instruments deliberately use broad 
language to allow for a flexible application depending on the facts of the case.159 On that 
basis, the real question is not whether the interpretation is legally justified in a strict sense, 
but rather whether it is a reasonable and proportionate interpretation in the circumstances. 
In this respect, Google Spain can be criticised as overly formalistic. For example, the AG 
commented that while deeming SEOs as controllers “might easily be defended as a logical 
conclusion of a literal and perhaps even teleological interpretation of the Directive” such an 
approach “completely ignores” that when the DPD was drafted it was not possible to fore-
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see the full emergence of the internet.160 The AG cautioned that, if SEOs were treated as 
controllers, such a broad interpretation could cover “virtually everybody owning a 
smartphone or a tablet or laptop computer”.161 He reasoned that such an outcome demon-
strated the “irrational nature of the blind literal interpretation of the Directive in the context 
of the internet,”162 and accordingly submitted that a reasonable and proportionate interpre-
tation demanded that a SEO not be considered a controller.163 Clearly, the ECJ did not 
agree. 
In view of the above concerns about an overly broad interpretation of “controller”, it is 
submitted that the approach in Google Spain must be seen as arising from, and limited to, 
the facts of that case. So, in the case of a name-search, according to the ECJ it was appro-
priate that a SEO be considered a controller because its activities were “liable to affect sig-
nificantly, and additionally compared with that of the publishers of websites” the privacy 
interests of the subject.164 However, in other cases there may not be this requisite signifi-
cant and additional interference with privacy; for example, in the case of the AG’s concerns 
about a “smartphone or a tablet or laptop computer”. On this line of argument, what is un-
fortunate about the Court’s approach is not that it was wrong, but that we become only in-
crementally closer to answering the fundamental question; when exactly is an entity a con-
troller, and what are its obligations? 
4.3.3 Interim conclusion on the controller question 
Ultimately, what becomes apparent from the above discussion is that defining a SEO as a 
controller, while workable, is problematic. These problems arise because, given their rela-
tively unique activities, SEOs simply don’t fit neatly with the notion of a controller. There-
fore, putting aside any debate about the merits of a right to delinking, with respect to the 
operation of that right it is submitted that SEOs should be treated as unique entities. While 
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Google Spain may have cemented a contrary position under the DPD, with respect to the 
GDPR the reference to “third parties” in amended Articles 17(1) and 17(3) provides the 
ideal avenue for such an approach. By treating SEOs as third parties the full effect of the 
right to delinking would be preserved, without any of the above complications which arise 
from treating a SEO as a controller; it is a “win-win” approach. Therefore, it is strongly 
submitted in this respect that the amended versions of Articles 17(1) and 17(3) should be 
preferred, and that under the GDPR SEOs should be treated as “third parties”. 
4.4 Extra-territoriality and non-EU search engines 
Both the DPD and GDPR seek to have extra-territorial effect outside of the EU in certain 
cases. This issue has received considerably scholarly attention. In short, some commenta-
tors express concern about over-reach by the legislation giving rise to various legal prob-
lems with enforcement, conflicts of laws and interference with territorial sovereignty. On 
the other hand, proponents of the extra-territorial reach argue that EU States must try and 
protect the privacy of their citizens from abroad, and that the situation is analogous to com-
pliance by any foreign company that wises to operate in an EU jurisdiction.165 In any event, 
a full analysis is beyond the present scope; rather, what is important is whether this extra-
territorial operation is satisfactory with respect to the right to delinking.  
The discussion is again best illustrated with reference to Google. The California based 
company Google Inc is responsible for Google Search. Google Search includes local EU 
versions such as google.es, and also ‘foreign’ non-EU versions such as google.com. While 
both versions are likely to be accessible within the EU, the local versions are specifically 
‘geared’ towards the relevant EU Member State; inter alia, they are tailored to the local 
language,166 and provide search results based on the users location.167 
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Potentially, the operation of Google Search does not involve any processing of personal 
data in the EU; while the exact location of Google Inc’s data centres is a secret, for the pur-
poses of Google Spain it was established that no processing of personal data relating to 
Google Search took place in Spain,168 and it is possible that no processing takes place in the 
EU. In these circumstances, the operation of the DPD and GDPR on Google Search may 
always depend on their extra-territorial provisions. Following Google Spain, based on the 
“establishment” criterion in DPD Article 4 it appears that local versions of Google Search 
will need to comply with the Directive.169 
While this resolves the operation with respect to local EU versions of Google Search, there 
remains a more complicated issue concerning the right to delinking against foreign versions 
such as google.com. Indeed, the fact that Google has not yet applied erasure beyond the 
local versions has led to some criticism that Google is evading the ECJ ruling.170 Given the 
broad meaning of “establishment” and “equipment”,171 potentially a citizen of the EU172 
may seek delinking from the search results of a foreign version of the search engine. Such 
an application may be attractive if the foreign version is popular in the EU,173 or where a 
particular SEO does not operate a local EU version in which case the foreign search engine 
would be the only possible target for enforcement.174 In the event a subject approached a 
European Court with such an application, there are essentially three potential outcomes: the 
application could be denied; the request could be upheld; the foreign SEO could be ordered 
                                                 
 
168 AG Opinion, above n27, [62]. Alsenoy, above n2, p26. Google Spain, [43]. 
169 It appears that the outcome will be the same under the GDPR; for the purpose of the present discussion, 
the wording of the analogous GDPR Article 3 is not materially different from DPD Article 4. 
170 Peltz-Steele, above n81. 
171 Potentially, given that a SEO ‘crawls’ EU servers for webpages the notion of “equipment” could capture a 
SEO which did not otherwise meet the “establishment” criterion in DPD Article 4. See Alsenoy, above n2, 
p26. However, it is acknowledged that the “equipment” criterion has been removed in the GDPR. See EU 
Parliament Resolution, above n6, Amendment 97. 
172 Interestingly, Kuner notes that the right is potentially also open to any citizen around the world: Kuner, 
above n7, p14-15. However, Google is currently applying the right on the basis that “individuals will need 
some connection to that [EU] country”: Fleischer, above n116, p7. 
173 However, Google actively redirects European users from google.com to the local EU versions, with the 
result that fewer than 5 per cent of European users use google.com: Fleischer, above n116, p3-4. 
174 However, Google Search has a local version in every EU Member State. 
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to tailor the search results it provides to citizens of the EU. Each possibility will be consid-
ered in turn. 
If the right to delinking doesn’t apply to foreign search engines, the extra-territorial effect 
of the regulation is clearly restricted. While this deals with the legal concerns that arise 
from extra-territorial laws, the risk is that it may render the EU regulations relatively 
worthless; EU citizens could simply use the foreign search engine. This concern is less 
prevalent where users have a strong preference for the local version. This may be because it 
provides more useful search results given the type of search request, or because language 
barriers exist; for example, for some internet searches Norwegian citizens may be relatively 
loyal to google.no for linguistic reasons. However, in cases where the foreign search engine 
is a suitable substitute the operation of the regulation may be severely compromised. In the 
context of a name-search, this may be the case if the subject has a particularly unique 
name, such that the results provided by a foreign version of Google Search are just as rele-
vant as the results in the local version.175 
On the other hand, it seems entirely inappropriate for the right to apply to all foreign search 
engines. There are likely to be (substantial) difficulties in enforcing such a broad operation, 
as foreign courts are unlikely to recognise the European law. Perhaps most importantly, in 
the case of lawfully published information US Courts will almost certainly not recognise 
the EU right to erasure against google.com.176 More broadly, it is also important to recog-
nise that Europe is not the policeman of the internet, and the EU must recognise the legal 
sovereignty of other countries to regulate their online affairs even though such foreign con-
tent may be accessible in Europe. This is especially so since the right to erasure is not one 
which is widely recognised by other countries, and therefore for which there is a degree of 
                                                 
 
175 In this respect, it is important to recognise that all versions of Google Search can potentially use the same 
‘index’, and therefore provide the same results. To the extent a local version provides different results, that 
may often relate to the ranking of webpages, as opposed to what webpages actually make up the search re-
sults as a whole. 
176 See Stuart, above n2, p487-492. Larson, Robert, ‘Forgetting the First Amendment: How Obscurity-Based 
Privacy and a Right to Be Forgotten Are Incompatible with Free Speech’ (2013) 18(1) Communication Law 
and Policy 91, p120. 
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‘consensus authority’ – in this sense it is not analogous to, for example, online protection of 
intellectual property rights, a matter on which many countries are signatories to the relevant 
conventions and treaties.177 
The third possibility would be to require foreign search engines to restrict the results they 
provide to EU citizens. So, for example, in order to comply with the EU regulations 
google.com would provide different search results to French citizens as compared to US 
users. The notion is not entirely new. As part of the Yahoo! case in France an investigation 
found that Yahoo! had the capability to block up to 90% of French users from accessing the 
offending content on the US website.178 However, there are a number of problems. In view 
of the preceding paragraph, there would be a question as to whether such a requirement 
could be legally enforced against the likes of google.com. Furthermore, technical capabili-
ties remain limited; among other techniques, VPN’s can easily mask a user’s country of 
origin. Also, the technological and economic burden of compliance would need to be ap-
propriately balanced. 
For the time being, it appears reasonably settled that the EU right to delinking only applies 
to local EU versions of search engines. In this sense, it is somewhat fortuitous that Google 
offers local versions of Google Search in every Member State; one can only imagine the 
complexity of the present discussion if all countries used google.com. But the matter 
should not be considered definitely settled, especially in the long run. There are numerous 
examples outside of the right to erasure where EU citizens have sought to enforce EU pri-
vacy or intellectual property standards on US internet companies.179 While such actions 
have generally had only limited success, the concern in the case of Google Inc is that the 
company potentially has significant assets within the EU jurisdiction capable of attach-
                                                 
 
177 See Edwards & Waelde (eds.) Law and the Internet (2009, Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing), p188. 
178 Ibid, p59-60; Reed, Chris, Making Laws for Cyberspace (Oxford University Press, 2012), p14. This con-
sideration may be particularly relevant if a SEO, instead of offering local versions of its search function, pro-
vided only one global URL but tailored its search results based on the location of the search request. 
179 See, for example, the “Wikipedia case”: Shoor, above n49, p493. See also: Schwartz, John, ‘Two German 
Killers Demanding Anonymity Sue Wikipedia’s Parent’, The New York Times (online) 12 November 2009. 
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ment.180 Nevertheless, it is submitted that European Courts must not attempt to enforce 
delinking from the likes of google.com; doing so would constitute an intolerable violation 
of US sovereignty, and would potentially create a transatlantic clash of unprecedented scale 
with respect to online regulation. 
4.5 Economic considerations 
This section will briefly consider the potential economic impacts of the EU recognising a 
right to delinking. The discussion does not attempt to provide any form of comprehensive 
economic analysis for or against the right to delinking. Rather, the more limited purpose is 
merely to highlight the potential impacts and caution against implementing potentially bur-
densome privacy protection measures without proper consideration of the economic impli-
cations. 
The right to delinking is not recognised in a number of important technology markets, in 
particular the US. For the EU, this raises a concern about whether the introduction of the 
right might place the Union at a competitive disadvantage in attracting investment from 
existing SEOs, and in facilitating the start-up of new European based SEOs. Broadly speak-
ing, complying with the right to delinking imposes a direct and indirect cost on a SEO. 
There is a direct economic cost in physically dealing with the delinking requests. For ex-
ample, in the month of June 2014 Google received more than 70,000 removal requests, 
with an average of 3.8 URLs per request. That means that Google must review over a quar-
ter of a million URLs and assess in each case, on the basis of the complicated criteria dis-
cussed above, whether delinking is required.181 In the event Google gets that assessment 
wrong, or the outcome is in any event challenged, there is also the potential for litigation 
costs and sanctions. As to indirect costs, if relevant search results are delinked users may 
switch to an alternative SEO and thereby reduce Google’s ability to attract advertising rev-
enue.  
                                                 
 
180 Although it appears many of those assets are held by subsidiary companies, thereby raising questions 
about the extent to which a judgment can be enforced. 
181 HOL Report, above n130, [33]. 
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In view of these costs, there becomes an economic incentive for a SEO to structure their 
operations to avoid the EU right to delinking. For example, Google Inc could potentially 
avoid the regulation by no longer offering local EU versions of Google Search. Alternative-
ly, a SEO may decide to only provide a local version in countries where the economic ben-
efits outweigh the cost of complying with the right to delinking.182 And, given the potential 
for extremely large fines under the GDPR,183 a SEO may consider it prudent to limit its EU 
exposure by removing, protecting or not investing further in EU based assets. Ultimately, it 
is a question for each SEO as to how it wishes to structure its operations in view of the EU 
regulation, and this paper will not indulge in the many hypothetical possibilities. For very 
large companies like Google, Bing or Yahoo!, in all likelihood the existence of the right to 
delinking will not warrant any dramatic change in their business structure.184 However, for 
a small SEO contemplating entry into the European market through the offering of local 
EU versions of its search function, or deciding in which country it wishes to establish an 
office or data centres, the potential for avoiding the regulation may carry greater weight.185 
There is also the potential for the right to operate discriminately against large SEOs, nota-
bly Google. This is because, given its overwhelming market share, in many cases a subject 
may only consider it necessary to pursue delinking from Google Search. Indeed, at least in 
the primary action apparently Mr Gonzalez did not feel it necessary to proceed against Ya-
hoo! or Bing. While this may not be unfair – Google is well placed to deal with the burden 
with a market capitalisation of over USD400 billion, – it is unjust. To the extent various 
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other SEOs are also contravening EU data protection laws, arguably equity demands that 
they also be required to comply with the regulations.  
However, there are concerns to the extent delinking requests are directed at small SEOs. 
The cost of compliance represents a potential barrier to entry. There is also a concern that, 
as a small company, inadequate resources may prevent a proper assessment of the request 
and therefore result in ‘blind’ delinking.186 By comparison, a large SEO which can afford 
to properly assess each request may end up retaining a greater number of search results, 
cementing its competitive advantage. Taken together, these outcomes are potentially eco-
nomically undesirable for a market already heavily dominated by one participant. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the potential for economic benefits is also acknowledged. 
A key rationale behind the introduction of the GDPR is the need to protect consumer confi-
dence in the digital market, and thereby foster further economic growth.187 Indeed, there 
appears to be popular support for a right to erasure among European nationals; a 2011 sur-
vey revealed that 75 per cent of Europeans want to be able to delete personal information 
online whenever they want.188 Therefore, if the regulation results in more people using the 
services of SEOs, this may mitigate against the above concerns. 
Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether the potential economic costs of the right to de-
linking will have a negative effect on the European market. For the time being, the SEOs 
seem content to comply with the regulation without altering their operations. Furthermore, 
as a highly concentrated market characterised by a few large market participants, at least in 
the current circumstances concerns about the impact of the right on small SEOs seem neg-
ligible. That said, regulation is not without cost. This should always be kept in mind, espe-
cially with respect to potentially costly regulatory measures which will not be implemented 
                                                 
 
186 Ibid, [35]. 
187 European Commission, Press conference by Viviane Reding on the Data Protection Proposal (Video of 
Press Conference, European Commission Audio-visual Services, 25 January 2012), at 1.55. European Com-
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in the markets of competitor nations. This is perhaps even more important with respect to a 
law which at its foundation is concerned with protecting privacy as a fundamental right; 
because, by its very nature, a fundamental right can be given an infinite value, the potential 
for a cost-benefit analysis can be inappropriately restricted notwithstanding that it is entire-
ly warranted.189 While privacy is undoubtedly an important fundamental right, it is not ap-
propriate for privacy regulation to be contemplated in an economic vacuum. 
5 CONCLUSION 
On first hearing of the right to delinking, there is a propensity to view the concept with 
much scepticism. Why should someone have the right to delete a link to legally published, 
truthful information – if it was rightfully published, why shouldn’t you have the right to 
readily access it via a search enquiry? It is, after all, merely a statement of truth. However, 
on further contemplation the issue reveals its true complexity. In the end, the right is not 
contemplating that old books be burnt in the street or that someone have the power to re-
write the past. Rather, it is dealing with a unique problem that arises from the now ubiqui-
tous internet; how do we deal with the serious threat to privacy posed by search engine 
results?  
When the full nature of this unique threat is contemplated, the very notion of a right to de-
linking becomes entirely less offensive. In the modern era there are becoming too many 
examples of intolerable abuses of privacy. Stuart notes two poignant illustrations from the 
US, where a right to delinking is not recognised: an intrusive video of a sports-caster which 
was originally uploaded by a stalker and which, notwithstanding numerous attempts over 
several years, remains a top result to the sports-caster’s name-search; mugshot websites 
which publicise arrest photos and demand a fee for their removal, which by reason of their 
popularity result in the relevant photos featuring prominently in a name-search.190 In such 
                                                 
 
189 Shaffer, Gregory, ‘Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the 
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cases, it is hard to reasonably argue against some form of greater protection for personal 
privacy. 
So, what then of the EU right to delinking? Save for the indulgent comments in the preced-
ing paragraph, this paper undertook to critically examine the right in view of the manner in 
which it operates; whether the framework adequately balances the various conflicting fun-
damental rights, and whether it could be applied in a practical, equitable, efficient and cer-
tain manner. In view of this criteria, ultimately this paper has submitted that there are seri-
ous deficiencies with the current framework. In particular, the discussion raised concerns 
about, inter alia, the approach adopted by the ECJ in Google Spain, that SEOs may not 
properly deal with requests for delinking, and that it is inappropriate to treat SEOs as con-
trollers. However, it is acknowledged that to some extent these concerns may turn out to be 
temporary; the creation of better guidelines for SEOs to assess delinking requests will help 
ensure an appropriate balancing of rights, and under the GDPR there is the potential for 
SEOs to be treated as “third parties”.  
However, perhaps the most promising addition to the debate comes from the conduct of 
Google itself in the few months that have passed since the decision in Google Spain was 
handed down. The company has not thumbed its nose at the ruling, but appears to be dili-
gently trying to work through the thousands of requests it has received. And, most im-
portantly, it appears to be taking a well-reasoned, proportionate approach in its assessment 
– results concerning matters such as botched medical procedures, and recent arrests for 
financial crimes, remain (rightly) linked – results concerning matters such as spent criminal 
convictions, and conduct that occurred as a minor, have been (rightly) delinked.191 It would 
appear that, at least for some, it may be possible to live by Elizabeth Darcy’s philosophy 
after all. 
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